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AB-814 Rape: withdrawal of consent.(2003-2004)

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Amended  IN  Assembly  March 24, 2003

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE— 2003–2004 REGULAR SESSION

Assembly Bill
No. 814


Introduced  by  Assembly Member Chu
(Coauthor(s): Senator Romero)

February 20, 2003


An act to amend Section 261 261.6 of the Penal Code, relating to rape.


LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST


AB 814, as amended, Chu. Rape: withdrawal of consent.
Existing law defines the crime of rape as an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under specified circumstances. The California Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant may be found guilty of rape if the victim, having consented, withdraws that consent during intercourse and communicates that withdrawal.
This bill would codify this ruling, and would provide that, in determining a defendant’s guilt in a withdrawn consent case, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the withdrawn consent shall be considered, including, but not limited to, whether a reasonable person would have understood the consent to be withdrawn and whether the defendant responded to that withdrawal within a reasonable time.
Vote: MAJORITY   Appropriation: NO   Fiscal Committee: NO   Local Program: NO  

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:


SECTION 1.

Section 261 of the Penal Code is amended to

Section 261.6 of the Penal Code is amended to read:

261.6.
 (a) In prosecutions under Section 261, 262, 286, 288a, or 289, in which consent is at issue, “consent” shall be defined to mean positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.
(b) A current or previous dating or marital relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent where consent is at issue in a prosecution under Section 261, 262, 286, 288a, or 289.
(c) Consent, as defined in subdivision (a), may be withdrawn at any point before or during the sexual contact by communicating that withdrawal. A withdrawal of consent terminates any earlier consent. In a prosecution under Section 261, 262, 286, 288a, or 289, it is immaterial at what point the consent was withdrawn so long as the withdrawal of consent was communicated.
(d) Nothing in this section shall affect the admissibility of evidence or the burden of proof on the issue of consent.

SEC. 2.

 It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments to Section 261.6 made by this act abrogate the decision in People v. Vela (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 237. It is also the intent of the Legislature that these amendments codify the opinion of the California Supreme Court in In re John Z. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, and establish an objective, totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining if consent was given or withdrawn.

read:

261.

(a)Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances:

(1)Where a person is incapable, because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent, and this is known or reasonably should be known to the person committing the act. Notwithstanding the existence of a conservatorship pursuant to the provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Part 1 (commencing with Section 5000) of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code), the prosecuting attorney shall prove, as an element of the crime, that a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability rendered the alleged victim incapable of giving consent.

(2)Where it is accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.

(3)Where a person is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been known by the accused.

(4)Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this paragraph, “unconscious of the nature of the act” means incapable of resisting because the victim meets one of the following conditions:

(A)Was unconscious or asleep.

(B)Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.

(C)Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraud in fact.

(D)Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraudulent representation that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose when it served no professional purpose.

(5)Where a person submits under the belief that the person committing the act is the victim’s spouse, and this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce the belief.

(6)Where the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person, and there is a reasonable possibility that the perpetrator will execute the threat. As used in this paragraph, “threatening to retaliate” means a threat to kidnap or falsely imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.

(7)Where the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by threatening to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official. As used in this paragraph, “public official” means a person employed by a governmental agency who has the authority, as part of that position, to incarcerate, arrest, or deport another. The perpetrator does not actually have to be a public official.

(8)Where consent, once given, is withdrawn by the victim either before or during sexual intercourse, and the act is accomplished or continued through any of the means set forth in paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive, after the victim’s communication of that withdrawal. In determining a defendant’s guilt under this paragraph, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the withdrawn consent shall be considered, including, but not limited to, whether a reasonable person would have understood the consent to be withdrawn and whether the defendant responded to that withdrawal within a reasonable time.

(b)As used in this section, “duress” means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising the existence of duress.

(c)As used in this section, “menace” means any threat, declaration, or act which shows an intention to inflict an injury upon another.