1473.
(a) A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment or restraint.(b) (1) A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
(A) False evidence that is material on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to the person’s incarceration.
(B) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of
guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
(C) (i) New evidence exists that is presented without substantial delay, is admissible, and is sufficiently material and credible that it more likely than not would have changed the outcome of the case.
(ii) For purposes of this section, “new evidence” means evidence that has not previously been presented and heard at trial and has been discovered after trial.
(D) A significant dispute has emerged or further developed in the petitioner’s favor regarding expert medical, scientific, or forensic testimony that was introduced at trial or a hearing and that expert testimony more likely than not affected the outcome of the case.
(i) For purposes of
this section, the expert medical, scientific, or forensic testimony includes the expert’s conclusion or the scientific, forensic, or medical facts upon which their opinion is based.
(ii) For purposes of this section, the significant dispute may be as to the reliability or validity of the diagnosis, technique, methods, theories, research, or studies upon which a medical, scientific, or forensic expert based their testimony.
(iii) Under this section, a significant dispute can be established by credible expert testimony or declaration, or by peer reviewed literature showing that experts in the relevant medical, scientific, or forensic community, substantial in number or expertise, have concluded that developments have occurred that undermine the reliability or validity of the diagnosis, technique, methods, theories, research, or studies upon which a medical, scientific, or forensic
expert based their testimony.
(iv) In assessing whether a dispute is significant, the court shall give great weight to evidence that a consensus has developed in the relevant medical, scientific, or forensic community undermining the reliability or validity of the diagnosis, technique, methods, theories, research, or studies upon which a medical, scientific, or forensic expert based their testimony or that there is a lack of consensus as to the reliability or validity of the diagnosis, technique, methods, theories, research, or studies upon which a medical, scientific, or forensic expert based their testimony.
(v) The significant dispute must have emerged or further developed within the relevant medical, scientific, or forensic community, which includes the scientific community and all fields of scientific knowledge on which those fields or disciplines rely and shall not be
limited to practitioners or proponents of a particular scientific or technical field or discipline.
(vi) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that they are entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause why relief shall not be granted. To obtain relief, all the elements of this subparagraph must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
(2) For purposes of this subdivision, “false evidence” includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by the state of scientific knowledge or later scientific research or technological advances.
(3) Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a
writ of habeas corpus brought under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1).
(4) This subdivision does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for an expert who repudiates the original opinion provided at a hearing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by scientific research, technological advancements, or because of a reasonable dispute within the expert’s relevant scientific community as to the validity of the methods, theories, research, or studies upon which the expert based their opinion.
(c) This section does not change the existing procedures for habeas relief.
(d) This section does not limit the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or preclude the use of any other remedies.
(e) Notwithstanding any other law, a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted after judgment has been entered based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745, if that section applies based on the date of judgment as provided in subdivision (k) of Section 745. A petition raising a claim of this nature for the first time, or on the basis of new discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed a successive or abusive petition. If the petitioner has a habeas corpus petition pending in state court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition with a claim that the petitioner’s conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745. The petition shall state if the petitioner
requests appointment of counsel and the court shall appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and either the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745 or the State Public Defender requests counsel be appointed. Newly appointed counsel may amend a petition filed before their appointment. The court shall review a petition raising a claim pursuant to Section 745 and shall determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the state declines to show cause. The defendant may appear remotely, and the court may conduct the hearing through the use of remote technology, unless counsel indicates that the defendant’s presence in court is needed. If the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis for its conclusion.
(f) If the court holds an evidentiary hearing and the petitioner is incarcerated in state prison, the petitioner may choose not to appear for the hearing with a signed or oral waiver on record, or they may appear remotely through the use of remote technology, unless counsel indicates that the defendant’s presence in court is needed.
(g) For purposes of this section, if the district attorney in the county of conviction or the Attorney General concedes or stipulates to a factual or legal basis for habeas relief, there shall be a presumption in favor of granting relief. This presumption may be overcome only if the record before the court contradicts the concession or stipulation or it
would lead to the court issuing an order contrary to law.
(h) (1) If after the court grants postconviction relief under this section and the prosecuting agency elects to retry the petitioner, the petitioner’s postconviction counsel may be appointed as counsel or cocounsel to represent the petitioner on the retrial if both of the following requirements are met:
(A) The petitioner and postconviction counsel both agree for postconviction counsel to be appointed.
(B) Postconviction counsel is qualified to handle trials.
(2) Counsel shall be paid under the applicable pay scale for appointed counsel. Otherwise, the court shall appoint other appropriate counsel.